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YERSHOV V. GANNETT: RETHINKING THE VPPA IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY
Ariel Pardee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy in the twenty-first century is a slippery concept.  It exists in
the shadows of technology, peeking out in companies’ privacy policies, or being 
dragged out by the media after a data breach or a new technology oversteps 
consumers’ personal privacy boundaries.1 The collection of personal information 
from mobile devices by mobile applications has also generated significant concerns 
for some users.  What information are these companies collecting?  What are they 
doing with it?  With whom are they sharing it?  Much of the controversy stems from 
the practice of interest-based advertising. 
While interest-based advertising is not a new phenomenon, modern technology 
coupled with advanced data collection techniques and data analysis methods have 
shaped the practice into an exponentially more sophisticated—and ubiquitous—
industry than it was before.2 From the standpoint of some mobile users the practice 
feels tantamount to being constantly surveilled,3 while other users seem to 
understand that part of conducting one’s affairs online means, in many cases, one’s 
informational data is going somewhere.4 For better or worse, only limited guidance 
for the practice has been provided by federal legislation or regulation.5 In particular, 
the agency charged with “protecting America’s consumers,” the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), has promulgated almost no regulations that restrict or control 
the collection and disclosure of mobile device data by private companies.6 As a 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018.  The Author thanks Professor 
Peter Guffin for his time and guidance in helping her navigate the nuances of Information Privacy Law. 
1. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html?action=
click&contentCollection=Technology&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article; 
Herb Wisebaum, ‘Hell No Barbie’: Social Media Campaign Targets Talking Doll, NBC NEWS, (Nov. 9, 
2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/hell-no-barbie-social-media-campaign-
targets-talking-doll-n459936.
2. See CRAIG DEMPSTER & JOHN LEE, THE RISE OF THE PLATFORM MARKETER: PERFORMANCE 
MARKETING WITH GOOGLE, FACEBOOK AND TWITTER, PLUS THE LATEST HIGH-GROWTH DIGITAL 
ADVERTISING PLATFORMS 2-3 (2015); see also Shea Bennett, The Evolution of Marketing Data—From 
Direct Mail to Twitter (1960-2012), ADWEEK: SOCIALTIMES, (July 3, 2013, 3:00PM), http://www.
adweek.com/socialtimes/marketing-data-history/487271.
3. See Natasha Singer, Sharing Data but Not Happily, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/05/technology/consumers-conflicted-over-data-mining-policies-report-finds.html. 
4. Id.
5. Despite the introduction of multiple over-arching data protection laws, Congress has only 
managed to enact one, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which specifically regulates the 
collection of data by online companies designed to serve children. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012). 
6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The FTC 
specifically regulates the collection and disclosure of data in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013).  Excluding COPPA, the FTC does not regulate the general collection and 
disclosure of data by ad tech companies, but instead relies on existing regulations prohibiting unfair trade 
and deceptive practices, such as when a company violates its own stated privacy policy. See Jennifer 
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result, some disconcerted mobile device users have asked courts to interrupt the 
practice using the only means available to them: arguably outdated privacy laws 
written long before the information age went mobile.
Yershov v. Gannett is just such a case.7 Plaintiff Alexander Yershov asked the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and later the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals, to find defendant Gannett Satellite Information Systems, 
Inc. (“Gannett”), the owner of the USA Today Mobile App, in violation of a law 
written long before mobile applications—or mobile internet technology in general—
became mainstream.8 The 1988 law, called the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(“VPPA” or “the Act”), was originally enacted to prohibit individuals’ video cassette 
rental histories from being disclosed to third parties.9 In deciding Gannett’s motion 
to dismiss the claim, both the district court and the First Circuit were tasked with 
deciding whether to interpret two definitions within the Act so broadly that: (1) 
certain data collected from a mobile application on a smartphone would fall within 
the statutory definition of “personally identifiable information”; and (2) whether the 
use of a free downloaded mobile application would make a user a “consumer,” within 
the meaning of the statute.10 The district court found that while the data was 
personally identifiable information, Yershov was not a consumer under the VPPA 
definition, and subsequently granted Gannett’s motion to dismiss.11 On appeal by 
Yershov, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, holding that not only 
was the data personally identifiable information, but that Yershov was in fact a 
consumer within the definition provided by the VPPA.12
This Comment will challenge the courts’ characterization of the mobile device’s 
GPS location and the associated unique device identifying number collected and 
disclosed by Gannett as personally identifiable information (“PII”) under the VPPA, 
as neither piece of information fits within the bounds of the definition as identifying 
a “particular person.”13 Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the First Circuit 
interpreted the statutory definition of “consumer” too broadly when it held that the 
simple act of downloading a free mobile application is synonymous with becoming 
a “subscriber,” a subset of the VPPA’s definition of “consumer.”  Rather than reading 
                                                                                                     
Woods, Federal Trade Commission’s Privacy and Data Security Enforcement Under Section 5,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young
_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/federal_trade_commissions_privacy.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2017).  However, the FTC recently published a consumer privacy report that outlines best 
practices for businesses and policymakers. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN 
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations /120326privacyreport.pdf. 
7. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2015) 
rev’d, 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016).
8. Many see the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 as the moment when smartphones—and the 
mobile internet—moved beyond rudimentary web browsers and email checking. See, e.g., Fred 
Vogelstein, The Day Google Had to ‘Start Over’ on Android, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2013/12/the-day-google-had-to-start-over-on-android/282479/. 
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (2012).
10. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 141, 148; Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 
482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016).
11. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 146, 149.
12. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486, 489-90. 
13. S. Rep. No. 100–599, at 12 (1988).
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the word “subscriber” as it is plainly and ordinarily understood, the First Circuit 
interpreted the term “subscriber” as virtually synonymous with the term “user” or 
“viewer,”14 and in doing so has expanded the application of the statute far beyond 
the intention of the legislation’s authors.  A statute such as this one is best read 
narrowly, so as to avoid requiring the courts to read contemporary legislative intent 
into antiquated legislation.  As Justice Samuel Alito has suggested, “[i]n 
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy 
concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing 
public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”15
This Comment will also attempt to shed a bit of light on the mobile advertising 
technology (“ad tech”) ecosystem from which Yershov and similar cases have arisen.  
It will explore the curious reliance that mobile technology has on data collection by 
the mobile ad tech industry, and the direction of information privacy regulation in 
the mobile ad tech universe by both the companies themselves, and government 
regulators.
To these ends, Part II sets the stage of the modern ecosystem of mobile internet 
advertising technology; Part III takes the reader back to examine the VPPA’s origins 
and purpose; Part IV provides the procedural background of Yershov v. Gannett; Part 
V analyzes the courts’ decisions and reasoning in Yershov, and the implications 
thereof; and Part VI examines the possible future of information privacy law relating 
to mobile internet technology and the collection of data from mobile devices. 
II.  MOBILE TECHNOLOGY AND THE AD TECH ECOSYSTEM
A. “If You’re Not Paying for It, You’re the Product”16
No one could have predicted the radical evolution of targeted marketing during 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  The advent of internet technology, and later 
the mobile internet, transformed targeted marketing—now called interest-based 
advertising—into a complex and sophisticated ecosystem that runs largely on the 
synergistic interactions of four big players: website and app publishers; users and 
consumers of mobile internet technology; advertisers; and third party advertising 
companies.17 Simply put, mobile app and website publishers create, maintain, and 
improve the mobile internet, and have a reasonable expectation to get paid for these 
contributions.  Mobile users want a high quality and innovative mobile internet 
experience, but expect most websites and apps to be accessible at marginal or zero 
                                                                                                     
14. That Congress chose to use the word “subscriber” and not “user” or “viewer” was noted by the 
Eleventh Circuit in its interpretation of the VPPA.  Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256-
57 (2015). 
15. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012). 
16. The saying—and the underlying idea—are not easily attributed to any one person, but can be 
found throughout the marketing sector’s history as early as the 1980’s. See Jonathan Zittran, Meme Patrol: 
“When Something Online is Free, You’re Not the Customer, You’re the Product.” HARVARD UNIVERSITY:
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (Mar. 21, 2012), http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureofthe
internet/2012/03/21/meme-patrol-when-something-online-is-free-youre-not-the-customer-youre-the-
product/.
17. See How Does It Work, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/
understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
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cost.  So how can publishers expect to be compensated for their work if consumers 
are unwilling to pay for it?  Taking a page from the playbook of traditional media 
operations, webpage and in-app advertising has provided a significant source of 
revenue for publishers.18 Advertisers are willing and eager to pay for the opportunity 
to advertise to publishers’ users; and the more likely a particular user is to be 
interested in purchasing the advertised product or service, the more valuable that 
advertising opportunity is to the advertiser.19 Third party advertising companies 
enter the system to connect the dots—they collect, organize, and analyze interest-
based and demographic information about users collected from various sources, so 
as to better predict who those interested users are, thus increasing the value of 
advertising opportunities online—hence, interest-based advertising’s integral role in 
the internet as we know it.20
B. A Primer on Mobile Application Advertising
As alluded to above, most advertisements one sees in a mobile application are 
not virtual billboards seen by all who happen to use a particular app.  Rather, the 
point of modern advertising technology is to get “the right message, to the right 
person, in the right place, at the right time.”21 By collecting and analyzing 
demographic information and information about users’ interests, companies are able 
to target marketing efforts to the users most likely to be interested in—and then 
purchase—the product or service.22 From the perspective of a user, her online 
experience is—dare I say—enhanced by being shown ads that are relevant to her 
interests.  Some in the ad tech industry would go even further and say advertising 
companies are actually providing a service to users by educating them about new 
products they are likely to find useful.23
The techniques developed by third party advertisers to collect user information 
from internet sources have evolved alongside internet technology.  Methods that 
have worked in a desktop internet browser are not as effective on a mobile internet 
browser.24 Moreover, a significant portion of time spent on a mobile device is not in
                                                                                                     
18. Spending on digital advertising in 2015 reached $59.6 billion, and over half of that was spent on 
mobile advertising. See Kristine Lu & Jesse Holcomb, Digital News Revenue: Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (June 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/digital-news-revenue-fact-sheet/. 
19. DEMPSTER & LEE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 13-14.
20. See NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
21. DEMPSTER & LEE, supra note 2, at 116; see also Mike Sands, How the Cookie Crumbles in a 
Mobile-First World, MARTECH TODAY, (Dec. 15, 2015), https://martechtoday.com/cookies-crumble-
mobile-first-world-154114.
22. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400/
behavadreport.pdf; see also Carol Hildebrand, 3 Signs That Mobile Data is the New Marketing Overlord,
FORBES: ORACLEVOICE, (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/ 2015/11/16/3-
signs-that-mobile-data-is-the-new-marketing-overlord/#49e4a34e46f6. 
23. See generally Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Hidden Benefactor: How Advertising Informs, 
Educates, & Benefits Consumers, PROGRESS SNAPSHOTS, Feb. 2010, at 1-2.
24. Sands, supra note 21.  While ad tech companies can and do employ the use of third-party 
“cookies,” (text files placed in a desktop browser for the purpose of data collection by companies other 
than the website’s publisher) most mobile browsers have blocked third-party cookies from being used.  
Additionally, cookies simply do not work in mobile apps.  Additionally, as users have begun to use more 
than one device—smartphones, laptops, tablets, smart TVs, etc.—the ad tech sector has developed 
technology to track users’ online behavior across multiple devices, called cross-device targeting.  This 
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a browser at all, but rather in various mobile applications.25 Apps are programmed 
to collect data, often by permission, directly from users’ devices.26 Upon 
downloading and opening the app, a user may be asked to sign into an existing user 
profile, or to create a new profile with a user name or email address.  Once registered 
and signed in, the publisher of the app can track the user’s viewing habits and 
purchasing history within that publisher’s internet presence, and across multiple 
devices.27 This type of data collection—the collection of data by a mobile 
application with which the user has a direct relationship—is known in the ad-tech 
sector as “first party data.”28 An app publisher may also provide that same data to a 
third party advertising company, making the data “third party data,”29 a concept that 
will be discussed further below.
But not all first party or third party data is organized using identifiable 
information like names or email addresses.  Instead, many app publishers and third 
party advertising companies organize collected information by linking it to a
pseudonymous number associated with a particular device.30 Prior to 2012, this 
number—a unique alpha-numeric sequence called a “mobile device identifier”—was 
a number permanently associated with the specific device’s hardware.31 The user of 
the device had little or no ability to prevent apps from using the mobile device 
identifier for advertising purposes and therefore had little control over what 
information was being associated with it.32 In 2012, after Congress voiced concerns 
about mobile device identifiers and consumer privacy,33 the industry abandoned 
them for another pseudonymous identifier referred to as a “mobile advertising 
identifier.”34 A mobile advertising identifier operates in a way similar to its 
                                                                                                     
technology is not without its critics. See The Editorial Board, Monitoring Your Every Move, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/opinion/monitoring-your-every-move.html 
(explaining cross-device targeting and asserting a need for more federal regulation).
25. How Mobile Apps Stack Up Against Mobile Browsers, EMARKETER, (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.emarketer.com/Article/How-Mobile-Apps-Stack-Up-Against-Mobile-Browsers/1013462. 
26. Kenneth Olmstead, Mobile Apps Collect Information About Users, With Wide Range of 
Permissions, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/29
/mobile-apps-collect-information-about-users-with-wide-range-of-permissions/.
27. See id.
28. See Getting to Know You, THE ECONOMIST, (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-online-avidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party. 
29. See id. 
30. Many companies see the benefit of maintaining users’ trust and privacy, and have joined self-
regulatory agencies committed to developing best practices of the ad tech industry. See About the NAI,
NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/about-nai/about-nai, (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2017); see also How Does It Work, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.network
advertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
31. Apple called the number the “unique device identifier” (“UDID”), while Google called it the 
“Android ID.” See Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You: A Journal 
Investigation Finds That iPhone and Android Apps Are Breaching the Privacy of Smartphone Users,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2010),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870469400457602008370
3574602. 
32. See id. (“The great thing about mobile is you can’t clear a UDID like you can a cookie.”).
33. See Connie Guglielmo, Congress Queries Apple, iPhone Developers About Privacy, FORBES,
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2012/03/22/congress-queries-apple-
iphone-app-developers-about-privacy/#348781ca3885. 
34. Apple calls this number the Identifier for Advertisers (“IDFA”), where Android calls the number 
the Google Advertising ID (“GAID”). See Understanding Online Advertising: Glossary, NETWORK
ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/glossary
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predecessor, in that apps and advertising companies may use it as a common tag for 
data that mobile apps collect about a user.  However, unlike the mobile device 
identifier, the mobile advertising identifier is designed to be reset or turned off 
entirely at any time by the user simply by the press of a button in the device’s settings, 
thus returning some control of data collection by apps to the user and generally 
reducing some users’ privacy concerns.35
As indicated previously, mobile application and website publishers may employ 
third party advertising companies to analyze the data that they collect.  These 
companies, which sometimes operate as data analysis firms or “data brokers,” gather 
information from sources on the web, mobile apps, and sometimes from offline 
sources in order to compile comprehensive dossiers of users’ information.36 Some 
firms claim to have up to 100 data points on mobile users.37 While it is likely that 
identifiable information like names, home addresses, or email addresses are 
incorporated into these dossiers, companies in the business of online advertising are 
less interested in that type of information, and more interested in demographic and 
interest data.38 After all, the principal purpose of this type of data collection and 
analyzation is to meet the advertiser’s ultimate goal: to show their online ads to those 
users who are most likely to purchase whatever they are selling.  Names and 
addresses have a limited ability to help make this determination. On the other hand, 
demographic information (e.g. age and gender), interest data (e.g. topics of articles 
read within media apps), and even geo-location information can give a much better 
idea to the advertising company about whether an advertisement will be successful 
with a viewer, without directly revealing his or her identity.39 With this type of 
information, an advertising company can then advertise to all viewers who match a 
particular category or demographic, for instance all users who are of a particular age 
range, who live in a particular area, and who are bicycle enthusiasts.  The more 
demographic and interest information an advertising company can collect—even 
without names or home addresses—the better they can predict which ads are relevant 
to which users. 
C.  The Spectrum of Personally Identifiable Information
Rather than being easily demarcated between identifiable and non-identifiable, 
personal information, like that mentioned above, is better described as falling along 
                                                                                                     
(last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
35. Laura Stampler, Here’s Everything We Know About IFA, the iPhone Tracking Technology in 
Apple’s iOS6, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:59 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/everything-
we-know-about-ifa-and-tracking-in-apples-ios-6-2012-10.
36. For a helpful infographic illustrating the collection of information by data brokers, see FED.
TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2014).
37. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
38. See Ilana, What Advertisers Know About You: Online Privacy and Personally Identifiable 
Information, RETARGETER, http://blog.retargeter.com/general/what-advertisers-know-about-you-online-
privacy-and-personally-identifiable-information (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); see also Frequently Asked 
Questions, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, https://www.networkadvertising.org/faq, (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2017) (“As a general rule, [interest-based advertising] . . . does not depend on information that 
personally identifies you . . . .”).
39. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
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a spectrum.40 At one end of the spectrum is the clearest category of PII: a person’s 
actual name.41 Further down the spectrum, but still widely considered PII, is data 
that is easily traced to a particular person using information in the public domain like 
home addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.42 Highly sensitive data like 
social security numbers and financial account numbers are also widely accepted as 
PII, not because they can be easily traced to a particular person, but because of the 
harm that can come from an unauthorized person gaining access to that type of 
information.
Toward the other end of the spectrum is pseudonymous identifiers like user 
names, unique device identifiers, mobile advertising identifiers, IP addresses, and 
browser fingerprints.  This is data that is not generally considered highly sensitive,
and cannot be easily re-identified by an ordinary person.43 It is also at this end of the 
spectrum, perhaps at the farthest end, where anonymous information like interest and 
demographics belong; things like age or hobbies (“18-24” and “video games”).  As 
suggested above, and perhaps surprisingly, many ad tech companies prefer the
pseudonymous and anonymous information at this end of the spectrum.  By using a 
mobile advertising identifier tag instead of a name, companies in the ad tech industry 
can capture and organize much of the demographic and interest data they need to 
market their products successfully, while maintaining the trust and confidence of 
their users.44
Two other pieces of data sometimes collected by mobile apps are at issue in 
Yershov: a user’s geo-location, and the titles of videos a user has watched.  First, 
mobile applications may collect a user’s location data using IP addresses, global 
positioning systems (“GPS”), Wi-Fi triangulation, or beacons.45 For advertisers, 
location data can provide a cache of inferential information: demographic 
information like income and education can be inferred by comparing a user’s primary 
location data to public census data; information about a user’s interests can be 
inferred by noting visits to museums, theme parks, or the wilderness.46 Location 
information can even indicate more narrow preferences like where a user prefers to 
                                                                                                     
40. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U 
L. REV. 1814, 1877 (2011) (discussing a spectrum of “information [that] can be about an (1) identified, 
(2) identifiable, or (3) non-identifiable person.”).
41. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 282-83.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 290.
44. Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: Designing for 
Transparency and Trust, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-
data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust (last visited April 14, 2017). 
45. MOBILE MKTG. ASS’N, Demystifying Data Location Accuracy: The New Frontier and Biggest 
Mobile Opportunity, http://www.mmaglobal.com/files/documents/location-data-accuracy-v3.pdf (last 
visited April 14, 2017).
46. See id. at 4. But see John Koetsier, 80-90% Of Mobile Ad Location Data Is Wrong, Says Top Ad 
Exec, FORBES, (Dec. 2, 2016, 2:14 PM) (suggesting that a substantial amount of the geo-location data
used by advertisers is wrong), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2016/12/02/80-90-of-mobile-ad-
location-data-is-wrong-says-top-ad-exec/2/#4f9cb69b666e. 
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shop or which restaurants a user frequents.47
Second, some advertisers are gathering data based on users’ mobile video 
consumption.  Americans in 2016 are spending an average of over three hours a day 
consuming media on mobile devices, and more than thirty minutes of that time is 
spent watching video content.  This represents a 300 percent increase since 2012.48
The average length of videos viewed on a mobile device are of shorter duration than 
those watched on a television or computer; full length television shows and movies 
are watched far less than videos with a duration of five minutes or less.49 This means 
the average person is likely to watch multiple short videos a day, probably consisting 
of some combination of comedic video clips (i.e. “viral videos”), music videos, 
movie trailers, sports clips, how-to videos, and news clips.50 As one might imagine, 
the aggregate of these videos watched over a period of time can reveal quite a bit of 
information about a user’s interests; information that is valuable to companies 
looking to market their products to a targeted audience. 
So how does the modern ad-tech industry’s collection of this type of 
pseudonymous and anonymous data fit into a 1988 statute written to restrict the 
disclosure of rental records of “prerecorded video cassette tapes” 51 by video rental 
stores?  Not easily. 
III.  THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1988
A. Origins
The collection of personal information by both governmental and private 
organizations became routine with the arrival of modern record-keeping technology 
after the Second World War.52 Following the advent of computers in the 1960s and 
further advances in data processing in the 1970s and 80s, Congress became 
concerned with the breadth and depth of this information.53 They enacted a series of 
federal statutes regulating the disclosure of particular kinds of personal information 
collected and held by particular entities. These included credit records,54 student 
education records,55 federally stored personal information,56 tax returns,57 bank 
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55. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012).
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records,58 and individuals’ cable television viewing habits.59 The VPPA came 
toward the end of that trend, and arose not out of a natural progression of privacy 
law, but as a hasty reaction to what members of Congress saw as an intolerable 
breach of privacy.
It began with President Ronald Reagan’s 1987 nomination of Judge Robert Bork 
to fill a vacancy on the United States Supreme Court.60 While the Senate Judiciary 
Committee vetted Bork in confirmation hearings, an industrious Washington City 
Paper reporter obtained Bork’s video rental history from the local video rental 
store.61 The list of videos, which was published in the newspaper for public scrutiny, 
was hardly damning; it showed only Bork’s penchant for Alfred Hitchcock and Cary 
Grant movies.62 But the idea that a citizen’s—or a legislator’s—video rental history
could be publicly released and published as news resonated with outrage in 
Congress.63 They worked quickly to introduce and enact a law prohibiting just that 
sort of disclosure.
B. The Statute
The law Congress enacted was called the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
(“VPPA”).64 It states, “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to 
any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such 
provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person . . . .”65 The statute also provides the 
following definitions: 
(1) the term “consumer” means any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods 
or services from a video tape service provider; . . .
(2) the term “personally identifiable information” includes information 
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video 
materials or services from a video tape service provider; 
(3) the term “video tape service provider” means any person, engaged in the 
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or 
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual 
                                                                                                     
58. Right to Financial Privacy of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012) (restricting the disclosure of financial 
records by financial institutions to governmental agencies).
59. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2001) (prohibiting the disclosure of 
personally identifiable information together with “the extent of viewing or other use by the subscriber of 
a cable service or other service provided by the cable operator.”).
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Protection Act, WAYNE ST. U., https://blogs.wayne.edu/informationpolicy/2013/11/30/protecting-
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62. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Personal but not Confidential: A New Debate Over Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/27/style/consumer-s-world-personal-but-not-
confidential-a-new-debate-over-privacy.html.
63. See id.; see also Video and Library Privacy and Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R. 
4947 and S. 2361 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
Of the Judiciary and S. Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law, of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 
18 (1988).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
65. Id. at § 2710(b).
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materials, or any person or other entity to whom a disclosure is made . . . .66
The law goes on to permit the disclosure of such information in certain 
circumstances: to the consumer; to anyone pursuant to the consumer’s written 
consent; in the regular course of business; “to a law enforcement agency pursuant to 
a warrant;” or “pursuant to a court order.”67
In addition to Congress’s primary concern (the public disclosure of video rental 
histories), the testimonial record from the joint congressional hearing in 1987 
expresses a separate concern: the collection and disclosure of this type of information 
for the purpose of targeted marketing.68 Senior Vice President of the Direct
Marketing Association, Richard Barton, appeared at the hearing and was questioned 
about that industry’s opposition to the bill.  In reference to personal information 
collected by private companies, he stated, 
And there is no doubt that direct marketing companies use this 
information in an attempt to increase sales. Companies in our industry want 
to know about a person’s interest to be better able to market products to that 
person. If you are a hiker, changes [sic] are you would be interested in a 
catalogue selling camping or fly fishing equipment . . . . These lists are 
closely controlled and they are used only for marketing purpose. They 
cannot be accessed over the counter and are maintained with a high degree 
of security.69
Reacting to Barton’s testimony, Senator Patrick Leahy shared his own 
perception of direct marketing tactics: 
Really, I have this vision of big brother, where somebody sits at a 
massive computer—somebody whom I have never seen, never will meet in 
my life—but that person can figure out that Patrick Leahy is this sort of 
person based on what he reads or what he thinks or what he views and, 
therefore, he gets pegged a certain way and we are now going to bring 
whatever the marketing tools are available against him. Do you see my 
concern?70
In response, Congress included a conciliatory provision in the VPPA that allows 
names, addresses, and video tape subject matter to be released for the purposes of 
targeted marketing, so long as the consumer has a reasonable opportunity to 
decline.71
Interestingly, Congress amended the in 2012, but the only provision that was 
altered was the requirement for video service providers to get written consent from 
the consumer every single time the provider wanted to disclose PII.72 Netflix, a video 
                                                                                                     
66. Id. at § 2710(a)(1)-(4).
67. Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(A)-(F).
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streaming service provider,73 successfully lobbied Congress for an amendment that 
would allow for a one-time electronic “opt-in” consent to be sufficient for disclosure 
for up to two years.74 Both the Senate and House Reports for the amendment, as 
well as the Senate Subcommittee Hearing transcript, spent a majority of their time 
discussing this particular provision, consequently leaving the more ambiguous 
statutory definitions at issue in Yershov as is. 
IV. YERSHOV V. GANNETT
The question before the Yershov court was whether the law laid out by Congress 
in the VPPA applies to the newest iteration of video consumption.  In 2013, Plaintiff 
Alexander Yershov owned a smartphone, and onto that smartphone he downloaded 
a free mobile application called the USA Today Mobile App (“the app”).75 He used 
the app to access news, entertainment articles, and video clips.76 At the time Yershov 
downloaded the app, he was never asked to consent to the disclosure of information 
collected by the app to any third party.77
The USA Today Mobile App Yershov downloaded was owned by Defendant 
Gannett Satellite Services, Inc. (“Gannett”), an international media company.78 The 
app was programmed to collect certain bits of data every time a user watched a video 
on the app: “(1) the title of the video viewed, (2) the GPS coordinates of the device 
at the time the video was viewed, and (3) certain identifiers associated with the user’s
device, such as its unique Android ID.”79 Gannett then sent this information to a 
third party data analysis firm, Adobe.80
Yershov, as the named party in the class action suit, filed a claim against Gannett 
in the Federal District Court of the District of Massachusetts under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988.81 Yershov argued that Gannett, as a video service provider, 
illegally disclosed to a third party information that identified him as having viewed 
specific videos, in direct violation of the VPPA.82 Gannett moved to dismiss the suit 
for failure to state a claim, asserting that Yershov did not adequately allege two 
elements of the claim: (1) that the data provided to Adobe was “personally 
identifiable information,” and (2) that Yershov was a “consumer.”83
The district court held that the information Gannett collected from Yershov and 
                                                                                                     
73. For more information on Netflix, see NETFLIX, Netflix’s View: Internet TV is Replacing Linear 
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82. Id at 140. 
83. Id. at 142.
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later disclosed to Adobe “constitutes personally identifying information within the 
meaning of the Video Privacy Protection Act.”84 It reasoned that a unique device 
identifier is the device’s “address” and, “[a] person’s smartphone ‘address’ is an 
identifying piece of information, just like a residential address.”85 This 
determination rests largely on the court’s exceedingly broad interpretation of the 
VPPA’s PII definition86 and diverges from nearly every other court holding on the 
issue.87 The court rejected the reasoning of the District Court of New Jersey, which 
held explicitly that an Android ID was not PII in the case In re Nickelodeon.88 The 
Yershov court stated, “Nickelodeon’s conclusion that ‘PII is information which must, 
without more, itself link an actual person to actual video materials’ is flawed. That 
conclusion would seemingly preclude a finding that a home address or social security 
number is PII.”89 The court only briefly mentioned the GPS location component, 
[p]resumably, that information would be sufficient to identify a very 
specific location (such as a building) from which the user viewed the video. 
It therefore appears possible to identify, with a relatively high degree of 
accuracy, the residential address of users . . . .90
The district court noted that “[i]t is also possible . . . that third parties such as 
Adobe have access to databases that link Android IDs to specific persons.”91
On Gannett’s second point, however, the district court agreed and held that 
Yershov was not a “subscriber” 92 and therefore not a consumer under the VPPA’s 
statutory definition.93 The court referenced several dictionary definitions and 
analyzed other applications of the word “subscription” when used in the context of 
online activity.94 It concluded that “where there is no payment of money, no 
registration of information, no periodic delivery, and no privilege to view restricted 
content, none of the necessary elements of a subscription are present.”95 Having 
found that Yershov was not a subscriber under those terms, and therefore not a 
consumer, the court dismissed the claim. 
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling 
to dismiss the claim.96 The First Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion 
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and reasoning regarding the claim’s PII element.  Although quite brief in its opinion, 
the court concluded that the statutory definition of PII is to be read broadly, and cited 
the accompanying Senate Report as support for this interpretation: “the drafters’ aim 
was ‘to establish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of personally identifiable 
information.’”97 The court only briefly referenced the GPS location data, 
analogizing it to a home address, “[g]iven how easy it is to locate a GPS coordinate 
on a street map, this disclosure would enable most people to identify what are likely 
the home and work addresses of the viewer.”98 Like the district court, the First 
Circuit also noted the complaint’s allegation regarding Adobe’s databases, and the 
possibility that Gannett knew that Adobe had the means to re-identify the Android 
ID.99
The First Circuit departed from the district court decision with regard to the 
statutory definition of “consumer.”100 The court concluded that Yershov was a 
“subscriber,” despite not having made a monetary payment, not having completed a 
registration of information, and not having received periodic delivery or any 
privilege to view restricted content.  The court reasoned that Yershov’s “access was 
not free of a commitment to provide consideration in the form of that information 
which was of value to Gannett.”101 The court also distinguished between the act of 
reading news from the USA Today website, and doing the same on the app. The court 
reasoned that the act of downloading the app was akin to the installation of a 
“hotline” directly into Yershov’s home through which Yershov could watch videos 
in exchange for providing his name and address.102 In other words, the court felt that 
downloading the app was a subscribing act. 
The First Circuit was explicit in its conclusion that its decision is to be read 
narrowly and that a claim under the VPPA is plausible when “Yershov used the 
mobile device application that Gannett provided to him, which gave Gannett the GPS 
location of Yershov’s mobile device at the time he viewed a video, his device 
identifier, and the titles of the videos he viewed in return for access to Gannett’s 
video content . . . .”103
At this time, the parties are preparing for trial in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts.
V.  ANALYSIS
To be sure, the First Circuit is not the only court that has struggled with 
interpreting the VPPA.  The Act has been described by other courts as “not well 
drafted,”104 and “not entirely clear.”105 That the VPPA necessarily applies to a 
continuously evolving subject matter—video technology—makes it especially 
challenging to interpret thirty years after its enactment.  Even the district court 
analogized the circumstances in Yershov as “an attempt to place a square peg 
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2017] RETHINKING THE VPPA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 265
(modern electronic technology) into a round hole (a statute written in 1988).”106 The 
Supreme Court has weighed in on interpreting statutes made ambiguous by 
technology: “[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, 
[a law] must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose.”107 This is perhaps easier 
said than done. 
A. Personally Identifiable Information Under the VPPA
The VPPA’s basic purpose is “[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to the 
rental, purchase or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.”108
Fundamental to this purpose is the concept of personally identifiable information, 
which despite being “one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation” remains 
without a uniform definition.109 In fact, depending on where one looks—at statutes, 
agency regulations and policy statements, industry self-regulation associations, or 
privacy policies of individual companies—PII is defined in a myriad of different 
ways.
For example, when Congress enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (“COPPA”)110 in 1998, they defined PII by enumerating specific examples, 
including a child’s name, address, email address, phone number, and social security 
number. 111 They also included another provision that defined PII as “any other 
identifier that the [Federal Trade] Commission determines permits the physical or 
online contacting of a specific individual.”112 This provision reflects Congress’s 
intention to incorporate flexibility into the definition of PII by leaving the term to be 
further defined by the FTC, which can—and has—expanded COPPA’s definition to 
include new technology.113
Other entities take a different approach to defining PII.  The Network 
Advertising Initiative (“NAI”), a not-for-profit ad tech self-regulatory association, 
defines PII as “any information used or intended to be used to identify a particular 
individual, including name, address, telephone number, email address, financial 
account number, and government-issued identifier.114 Thompson Reuters Westlaw’s 
Privacy Statement, possibly the most explicit explanation of them all, marks PII as
your name, address, phone number, email address, payment card 
information, and/or certain additional categories of information that 
identify you personally; and . . . do[es] not include username, technical 
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information (for example, Unique Device Identifier or “UDID,” Media 
Access Control “MAC” address, Apple’s Identifier For Advertising or 
“IFA,” and Internet Protocol or “IP” address), or numbers or alpha-numeric 
identifiers assigned by us, third-parties, or your computer.115
The VPPA definition of PII, on the other hand, leaves much to be surmised.  It 
states rather circularly that “personally identifiable information includes information
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or 
services from a video tape service provider.”116 In the words of the First Circuit, “the 
definition . . . adds little clarity beyond training our focus on the question whether 
the information identifies the person who obtained the video.”117 Or to quote another 
author’s paraphrased version of the definition, “PII is PII.”118 The only additional 
indication of what the Act’s drafters considered to be PII is found embedded in an 
exception to the Act’s general prohibition: “A video tape service provider may 
disclose personally identifiable information concerning any consumer to any person 
if the disclosure is solely of the names and addresses of consumers . . . .”119 In other 
words, names and addresses are without question PII under the VPPA. 
All frustration aside, it is likely that the drafters of the VPPA intended the 
definition of PII to be somewhat ambiguous in order to preserve the statute’s 
flexibility over time.  The VPPA’s accompanying Senate Report supports this theory: 
“the word ‘includes’ . . . establish[es] a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of 
personally identifiable information.”120 The district court deciding Yershov
interpreted the Senate Report to mean that “the universe of PII is greater than the 
consumer’s name and address.”121 Other courts have made similar conclusions.122
And this makes sense: email addresses and phone numbers, for example, were not 
mentioned in the VPPA, but are characterized as PII by any modern definition.123
However, the Senate Report also incorporates a limiting principle.  It explicitly 
states, “personally identifiable information is intended to be transaction-oriented.  It 
is information that identifies a particular person as having engaged in a specific 
transaction with a video tape service provider.”124 This is where both the district 
court and the First Circuit went wrong: neither an Android ID nor a GPS location 
sufficiently identifies a particular person under the conditions set forth by Congress
in the VPPA.
1.  Android ID Is Not PII
An Android ID—or any similar pseudonymous number—does not identify a 
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particular person.  It identifies a device.125 An Android ID is a number associated 
with a particular device that,126 when used for advertising purposes, acts as a point 
of connection in a spider web of informational data.127 When Gannett sent an 
Android ID and a video title to Adobe, it is likely that Adobe added the video title to 
other information in their database that was also connected to that Android ID.  For 
example, the Android ID might already be associated with the user’s gender or age 
range, or perhaps a notation that the user plays Angry Birds, or that she has an interest 
in cats, or that she once searched for an Italian restaurant in Manhattan.128 Could 
Adobe have linked the identifier to actually identifying information?  Maybe.  But, 
to borrow the succinctly stated words of the First Circuit, “there is certainly a point 
at which the linkage of information to identity becomes too uncertain, or too 
dependent on too much yet-to-be-done, or unforeseeable detective work,”129 and 
contrary to the First Circuit’s actual holding, the circumstances in Yershov are 
exactly that. 
Furthermore, should the definition of PII be read so broadly to include a 
pseudonymous number like an Android ID, video service providers are essentially 
forced to read an extra provision into the Act.  Not only would the VPPA prohibit 
the “knowing[] disclos[ure], to any person, [of] personally identifiable information . 
. . .”130 but also the knowing disclosure of non-PII to any person that may possess or 
have access to information that could re-identify the non-PII.131 The District Court 
for the Southern District of New York articulated the consequences of this argument 
in Robinson v. Disney, “[i]f nearly any piece of information can, with enough effort 
on behalf of the recipient, be combined with other information so as to identify a 
person, then the scope of PII would be limitless.”132 As such, the broad interpretation 
of PII embraced by the Yershov courts has been rejected by several courts before, 
and, for the reasons enumerated above, I anticipate the First Circuit will be an outlier 
on this issue for the foreseeable future. 
2.  GPS Location Is Not PII
Unlike the unique device identifier there was no caselaw on point prior to 
Yershov that addressed whether GPS location data is PII.  However, just like the 
device identifier, GPS location does not identify a particular person.  Rather, it 
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identifies a location.  The Yershov courts equated the GPS location data to a home 
address.133 However, while every home address is a location, certainly not every 
location is a home address. The GPS location would show wherever the video was 
watched—and maybe it was watched at a house, but not necessarily a house that 
identifies the particular viewer, which is what the statute requires.134 The user might 
only watch videos away from home where he can find Wi-Fi access, if he is one of 
the one-third of Americans without home broadband service.135 A GPS location 
might also identify a supermarket checkout line or a classroom at a law school, or 
any other place where there are people watching video clips daily. Or it could 
identify a building in Manhattan, but perhaps not the floor the video was watched 
on, because a smartphone GPS may not be able to calculate elevation.136 While it is 
tempting to equate GPS location to a home address, it is simply too far a stretch and 
requires too many assumptions to be considered PII.
Even taken together, the Android ID and GPS location require too many 
additional steps and too many assumptions to be PII.  The statute requires that 
information “identify a person,” and that standard is simply not met with a video 
viewed on an anonymous device in a location that cannot be assumed to be associated 
in any identifiable way to the owner of the device—or the viewer of the video.
B. Yershov Is Not a Consumer
In order to trigger a VPPA violation, the disclosed PII must identify a 
“consumer” of the video service provider.  The Act defines a consumer as “a renter, 
purchaser, or subscriber.”137 Yershov claims to be a “subscriber,” a term which is 
neither statutorily defined nor elucidated in the legislative history.  The First Circuit 
came to two conclusions in its analysis of the word “subscriber”: (1) a monetary 
payment is not a necessary element;138 and (2) subscription need only be “an 
agreement to . . . be allowed access to electronic text or services.”139
First, the court pursued the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the word 
“subscriber” by surveying dictionary definitions.140 However, instead of relying on 
“consensus dictionary definitions,”141 the First Circuit selected what appears to be 
the only definition available that does not require monetary payment, signature, or 
other additional affirmative action.142 The definition of “subscription” that the court 
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favors reads, “[a]n agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or 
services.”143 But even under this definition, to classify Yershov’s unilateral act of 
downloading Gannett’s free app, with no other communication between the two 
parties, cannot be called an “agreement.”  The court goes on to describe the 
interaction a different way, as Yershov having “provided Gannett with 
consideration,” the consideration being Yershov’s information.144 But this too is 
misleading.  To “provide” something to someone infers the element of knowledge or 
intent,145 yet it would seem that Yershov was oblivious to Gannett’s collection of the 
data.  That Gannett took the data cannot be evidence of an agreement.
The court also seems to have overlooked the first step of the ordinary meaning 
rule: “Follow the ordinary (also, ‘everyday’; or ‘commonsense’) meaning of the 
statutory texts . . . . A statute has an ordinary meaning if you’d use its terminology 
in normal conversation ‘without having other people look at you funny.’”146 Most 
people, either in 1988 or today, would not question what Congress meant by 
“subscriber.”  It is not a highly technical term like PII, but rather, in the context of  
“renter, purchaser, or subscriber,”147 it is a word used in everyday speech to mean 
one of two things: (1) “[a] person who makes a regular payment in return for 
entitlement to receive a periodical, membership of a society, access to a 
commercially provided service, etc.;”148 or (2) “[a] person who adds his or her details 
to an electronic newsgroup, mailing list, etc., in order to receive, or contribute to, its 
contents; a person who has signed up to receive messages or other information from 
a newsgroup, mailing list, etc.”149 According to the complaint, Yershov neither paid 
money, nor did he actually sign up to receive any information from Gannett.  Thus, 
the action cannot fall under the ordinary, everyday meaning of “subscriber.” 
In sum, under no definition of “subscriber” does the relationship between 
Yershov and Gannett fall.  Even the definition embraced by the First Circuit fails,
without more, to evidence an “agreement” between Yershov and Gannett.  Moreover, 
the broad interpretation by the First Circuit creates a definition that is vastly over-
inclusive, and would almost certainly apply not only to viewers of videos via free 
mobile app download, but to viewers of videos on websites as well, a consequence 
that the First Circuit explicitly attempted to exclude from its decision.150
C.  The Implications of the 2012 Amendment to the VPPA
One additional argument in support of a narrower interpretation of the 
definitions for both PII and subscriber is the fact that Congress amended the Act in 
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2012 without updating either definition.151 Included in the appendix of the Senate 
Subcommittee Hearing transcript was a submission by the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (“EPIC”).  EPIC urged the committee to: (1) reject the proposed 
amendment regarding electronic opt-in consent; and (2) enact an amendment to the 
definition of PII that would plainly include IP addresses and unique identifying 
numbers.152 Unfortunately, the Senate Subcommittee did not explicitly address 
EPIC’s second recommendation at the hearing, leaving the VPPA’s definition of PII 
as ambiguous as it ever was. 
However, an earlier House Report may suggest a narrower reading of the PII 
definition.  The Report explicitly states, “[t]his legislation does not change . . . the 
definition of ‘personally identifiable information’ . . . .”153 It goes on to explain, “the 
committee does not intend for this clarification to negate in any way existing laws, 
regulations and practices designed to protect the privacy of children on the 
Internet,”154 referring specifically to the broader, and more technologically current,
definition of PII in COPPA,
[COPPA] and its regulations apply to individually identifiable information 
about a child that is collected online, such as full name, home address, email 
address, telephone number or any other information that would allow 
someone to contact the child. The Act and Rule also cover other types of 
information—for example, hobbies, interests and information collected 
through cookies or other types of tracking mechanisms—when they are tied 
to individually identifiable information.155
The House Report seems to mark the clear differences between the definitions 
of PII in the VPPA and in COPPA.  Essentially, the House Report acknowledges that 
while the VPPA amendment will not broaden the definition of PII to include all that 
is covered by COPPA, the narrower definition of PII in the VPPA does not negate 
COPPA’s definition when regulating videos watched by children.
Some might argue that because Congress had the opportunity to expand the 
VPPA’s definitions of PII and subscriber but chose not to, that this is an indication 
that Congress intended the definitions of both terms to be construed narrowly.156
However, a better argument for the narrow interpretation of each term is that the 
VPPA is, by most opinions, an antiquated statute and to stretch the scope of the 
statute to encompass the facts of this situation, and others like it, is a misapplication 
of the law. 
                                                                                                     
151. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258 § 2, 126 Stat. 2414 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(2)(B) (2012)).
152. Id. at 59-60.
153. H.R. REP. NO. 112-312, at 3 (2011).
154. Id. 
155. Id. (emphasis added). 
156. It is generally understood that Congress’s inaction is not firm ground on which to base an 
argument for a particular interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 
(2002) (“We have elsewhere held, however, that failed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous 
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute,’ reasoning that ‘[c]ongressional inaction lacks 
persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . 
.’”) (citations omitted). 
2017] RETHINKING THE VPPA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 271
VI.  CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY AND CONSUMER CHOICE
In recent years, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have 
introduced sweeping legislation aimed at the collection, maintenance, security, and 
disclosure of consumer data, especially that by third-party data collectors.157 In 2015 
alone, five bills legislating commercial use and storage of data—which would
delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC—were introduced in Congress.158 None 
of these bills have been enacted, perhaps due to significant lobbying efforts in 
opposition to such regulation.159
While the FTC itself has advocated for more government regulation of consumer 
data collection,160 it has also made statements in support of the ad tech community’s 
effort to self-regulate.161 It has repeatedly applauded the efforts of self-regulatory 
associations,162 and continues to work with these associations to advance best 
practices in the industry as technology evolves.163 This is largely because self-
regulation is flexible in a way that federal and state legislation and regulation is not. 
Advertising technology is a constantly evolving landscape; which means the ability 
for self-regulation to respond quickly—and even stay ahead of—changes in the 
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market is a critical benefit.164 Moreover, businesses that align themselves with self-
regulatory associations indicate to consumers an organizational character for 
trustworthiness.  Research has shown that consumers are concerned with the 
commercial collection of data,165 and will share data more willingly with trustworthy 
companies.166 Therefore, in a Darwinian fashion, the companies that maintain data 
trustworthiness will flourish, and those who do not will wither.
To build consumer trust, both the FTC and self-regulatory associations agree 
that companies must embrace data collection transparency.167 Transparency is three-
fold: first, companies—including both first- and third-party data collectors—should 
develop and present simple and clear data collection and security policies to 
consumers.  Second, companies should educate consumers about what data they 
collect, and how it is used and secured.  Third, companies should create pathways 
for consumers to access the data that is collected, and create procedures to correct 
any inaccuracies.168
A related principle to transparency generally encouraged by both the FTC and 
self-regulatory associations is consumer choice.  Developing company policies and 
programs that allow consumers to choose which data they share and to whom it is 
disclosed is an important policy with which consumer advocates and the ad tech 
sector are still grappling.169
It can be said that the self-regulation model is a healthy compromise between 
pure market control and rigid government regulation.  In this sense, with regard to 
the VPPA and the evolution of video data and advertising technology, consumers 
would be best-served outside of the court system.  Instead, such concerns are better 
addressed by self-regulatory policies and enforcement procedures.  The fact is, more 
and more mobile technology consumers are becoming educated about data collection 
and dissemination, and mobile companies will be forced to comply with the 
recommendations of such self-regulatory associations, or be abandoned by their 
customers.  And while information privacy in the world of the mobile internet will
likely remain a slippery issue, a combination of consumer education and market 
forces may be the key to achieving a satisfactory balance between consumer privacy 
and the mobile internet as we know it.
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